Aave v3 itself was not hacked
The alert published by SlowMist on October 2 could easily give the impression that Aave had suffered another protocol hack. The technical reality is more specific. The vulnerable contract, FlashLoopAdapter, is a third-party module built on top of Aave v3 to automate certain strategies. The distinction echoes the 70 crypto hacks recorded in the second quarter of 2026, where the vulnerabilities did not always directly affect the protocol in the spotlight.
According to SlowMist’s analysis, the attack took place on Ethereum on October 1. Two Safe wallets with FlashLoopAdapter enabled were drained, ultimately allowing the attacker to retain approximately 114.09 ETH.
Stani Kulechov quickly responded to clarify the situation. Aave’s founder said that FlashLoopAdapter is not part of Aave v3’s contracts and described it as an external adapter developed by a third party.
Aave v3 itself therefore continues to operate normally. Lenders and borrowers who never used the module are not among the identified victims.
The vulnerability lies elsewhere: in the way FlashLoopAdapter checked permissions.
A fake Safe was enough to fool the module
FlashLoopAdapter can automatically open or close so-called “looping” strategies. For example, a user can deposit an asset as collateral, borrow against it, buy more collateral and repeat the process. This increases exposure without requiring a long series of manual actions.
To execute these operations, however, the module had significant permissions over the affected Safe wallets.
SlowMist explained that the open() and close() functions essentially checked whether the calling Safe identified FlashLoopAdapter as an authorized module. The attacker created a fake Safe contract that systematically answered “yes” to this check.
Once this barrier had been cleared, the attacker could control the swapRouter and the data passed to the swap function. They then misused the module’s permissions to call execTransactionFromModule() on the actual victim wallets.
The mechanism was fairly straightforward: the module already held a legitimate access key. The attacker did not need to break Safe. They found a way to convince the adapter that they were entitled to use that key.
This type of risk highlights why crypto wallet security now extends beyond protecting private keys alone. An authorized smart contract can itself become an entry point.
1,300 WETH repaid to unlock the collateral
The operation involved more than simply transferring a few ETH. The wallets held complex positions on Aave.
The attacker used temporary liquidity, including a flash loan, to repay approximately 1,300 WETH in debt. This allowed them to unlock the associated collateral, including weETH, before extracting the assets from the affected Safe wallets. SlowMist estimates the final profit at approximately 114.09 ETH.
There is an important detail here: repaying debt worth several million dollars can be part of a theft when the first step is to release substantially larger collateral.
The incident primarily underscores the risk created by DeFi composability. Aave can function properly. Safe can function properly. Yet an additional layer connecting the two can introduce a vulnerability serious enough to bypass the protections users expect.
BrefCrypto had already made the same point in the Coldcard case: compromising a tool built around Bitcoin does not mean that Bitcoin itself was hacked. The same rigor is needed here.
Approximately 114 ETH was indeed stolen. Two Safe wallets were indeed compromised through an authorized module. However, directly attributing the vulnerability to Aave v3 would be incorrect.
This attack targets a particularly critical area of DeFi: third-party contracts to which users delegate powerful permissions in order to automate their strategies.
